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I T IS NEARLY COMMON KNOWLEDGE that the kingdom of Hawai'i's
economic chaos following the passage of the McKinley Tariff in 1890
was a major contributor to the overthrow of Queen Lili'uokalani in
January of 1893. It is also well known that the Wilson-Gorman Tariff of
1894 boosted the fortunes of the nascent Hawaiian Republic by end-
ing the unfavorable provisions of the McKinley Tariff and restoring
economic prosperity to Hawai'i's plantations. The deleterious effects
of the two tariffs for the continued independence of the Hawaiian
kingdom has led some historians to suspect that undermining the
kingdom and supporting the republic were major unstated intentions
of U.S. tariff policy. Indeed, the role of U.S. commercial policy toward
Hawai'i is poorly understood and has for too long served as a reason
for implicating U.S. policy in the radical political changes in Hawai'i
in the 1890s. The McKinley Tariff, some historians argue, was a pre-
lude to U.S. support for the overthrow of the monarchy in 1893 and
eventual annexation of Hawai'i in 1898. Yet, an analysis of the poli-
tics behind both tariffs reveals that Hawai'i figured little in the new
aggressive commercial policy exemplified by the United States in the
late nineteenth century.
The context of U.S. commercial policy of the late nineteenth cen-
tury is well known. Between the end of the Civil War in 1865 and the
end of the century, the United States became one of the world's
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great economic powers. Due in part to considerable government aid
and high protective tariffs during and after the Civil War, the United
States experienced astonishing, if uneven, economic growth. The
population more than doubled to seventy-one million, which pro-
vided a dynamic internal market for goods. Wheat production tripled,
coal production increased eightfold, steel and rail manufacturing and
oil production increased twentyfold. Total imports of goods jumped
from $354 million to $765 million from i860 to 1897, while exports
rose from $239 million to $1.03 billion. By the end of the century,
Americans challenged Europeans for world markets in iron, steel, oil,
cotton, and wheat. Indeed, starting in 1874, the country's exports reg-
ularly exceeded imports, which created more efficient technology at
home and surplus capital for investment overseas. The U.S. share of
world trade rose from 6 percent in 1868 to 11 percent in 1913.
But rapid expansion came at a price. In 1873, a financial panic
marked the beginning of a twenty-three-year-long depression that,
with only a few brief upturns in the 1880s and early 1890s, threatened
the well-being of the industrial labor and farmers alike. The lingering
depression was due to the same productivity of factories and farms
that made the United States a major economic competitor in world
markets. Despite the growth of the domestic market, Americans pro-
duced more than they could consume. Hence, persistent deflation
characterized the era. To compensate, farms and factories increased
production, thereby aggravating the deflationary spiral. The period
was, in addition, marked by recurrent unemployment, strikes, and
riots in many large cities and the questioning of industrial capitalism's
ability to allocate resources and capital fairly.1
The Gilded Age's inability to find solutions to recurrent economic
dislocation was due to the lack of experience and understanding of
the rapid internationalizing of the economy. Even as the domestic
market expanded, key sections of the economy required overseas
markets to sustain profits. By the end of the nineteenth century, for
example, the iron and steel industry exported 15 percent of its goods,
sewing machine makers 25 percent, and oil refineries 57 percent of
their illuminating oil. Once self-sufficient farmers now depended on
unpredictable foreign markets to take 20 percent to 25 percent of
their wheat production and between 70 percent and 80 percent of
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their cotton crop. Moreover, growing competition from foreign wheat
and cotton growers in Russia, Argentina, Egypt and India forced
domestic growers to lower their prices while finding ways to sell
more.2
The economic turmoil of the Gilded Age led to a debate over solu-
tions to overproductivity that did not end until the election of William
McKinley in 1896. Some Americans, led by William Jennings Bryan,
argued that prices and employment could be improved by the federal
government's purchasing and coining silver in addition to gold so
that more money could be put in circulation. An inflated currency
would raise prices for commodities, aid rural debtors, accommodate
rapid economic growth, and assist the United States to capture for-
eign markets where silver was widely used (such as China and Latin
America). Corporate leaders, increasingly in control of the political
and economic system, pressured Congress and State Department to
find outlets for surplus production in foreign markets.
Fighting to protect the stability of the dollar, men like John D.
Rockefeller supported a gold standard with its deflationary economic
effects. The crucial 1896 election, coming at the end of the horrific
depression of 1893-1897, confirmed that the inflationary monetary
policy position of Bryan and the populists would not win the day. The
outward thrust of U.S. foreign policy, which had begun to actively
seek new world markets (but not landed expansion) as early as the
1860s, was exemplified by the new efforts to compete for Latin Amer-
ican markets. These efforts would shape commercial trade policy,
lead to the McKinley Tariff, and undermine Hawai'i's prosperity at a
crucial time in the kingdom's political history.
The key U.S. policy maker in implementing the search for new
Latin American markets was the Republican secretary of state under
William Henry Harrison, James G. Blaine (1889—1892). Believing
with Harrison that future economic stability required not acquisition
of more land but access to growing markets, Blaine organized and
then presided over the First International American Conference. At
the well-attended conference, Blaine proposed an ambitious agenda
to expand inter-American relations. Anticipating many of the fea-
tures of President Bill Clinton's North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA) policy, Blaine urged Latin American leaders to create
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an inter-American common market, a common currency, increased
cultural exchange, and a Pan-American highway system linking the
United States to the lucrative markets in South America. Although
the 1889 conference led to few real breakthroughs, it did confirm for
Blaine the need for creative commercial policy to pave the way for
sales abroad.
For Blaine, the high protective tariffs initiated by Lincoln and the
Republican Party during the Civil War had served their purpose well.
American industry had thrived in the postwar years as an interven-
tionist state assisted railroads, created corporate law, provided mini-
mal regulation of developing corporations, and provided for high tar-
iffs to shelter domestic manufacturing. A more innovative approach
to commercial policy was necessary, however, and the key lay in craft-
ing reciprocity treaties.
Blaine was not alone in staking much of America's economic future
on creative tariff solutions to Gilded Age economic problems. By the
late nineteenth century, Democrats and Republicans saw tariffs as a
means to ameliorate surplus production and the growing disparity of
income between labor and management. Historically, the Republi-
cans had generally found high protective tariffs to be a legitimate ini-
tiative of an activist government. Democratic leaders, reflecting the
party's states' rights tradition and its large agrarian constituency in
the South, generally favored modest revenue tariffs. But both parties
contained elements of all the principal economic groups, including
merchants, manufacturers, lawyers, bankers, farmers, and wage labor-
ers. Both parties sought compromise on the tariff rate that would best
meet import and export requirements as well as provide sufficient rev-
enue for the Treasury. In an era when local issues were more impor-
tant than national issues to most voters, both parties sought tariff rates
that would foster economic growth and thus social and political har-
mony. Democrats generally sought tariff reductions as the best means
to open markets to farmers, while Republicans saw higher tariff rates
as necessary to protect and expand industrial exports and access to
raw resources. In any case, the object of politicians in both parties
was to get elected; abstract issues were secondary. National political
figures such as Grover Cleveland, William McKinley, and Benjamin
Harrison focused on the tariff in part because it was less divisive than
controversial religious, ethnic, or economic issues that could destroy
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the valued "essential political center" of the era. Most important,
political leaders in both parties understood that the tariff policy could
offer something to nearly everyone while underwriting sustained eco-
nomic growth.3 Both parties shaped their tariff arguments to build
greater coalitions. Thus, the Republicans assured working men that
high tariffs protected their jobs from cheap labor in Europe and
industrialists, that high tariffs protected profits. Democrats aimed
their arguments toward Midwestern and Plains states' farmers by
claiming that lower tariff rates facilitated agricultural exports and
lower prices for manufactured goods. Meanwhile, interest groups
representing sugar, wood, wheat, cotton, steel and iron, oil, and a
host of other commodities pressured a compliant Congress into
adjusting specific rates up or down to favor their specific cause. None
of this complex domestic political interaction had much to do with
Hawai'i as an examination of the epochal 1890 McKinley Tariff
reveals.
Frustrated by the lack of tangible outcomes in the 1889—1890 Pan-
American Conference, Secretary of State James G. Blaine persisted in
his belief that Republican reliance on high tariffs was out of step with
the need for a flexible policy to facilitate access to lucrative markets.
Latin America, he felt, was a natural market because of the area's
exports of raw products and need for manufactured goods. Britain
and Germany had dominated these markets for years, leaving the Uni-
ted States dependent on raw products (such as sugar, tea, molasses,
and hides) and having a net outflow of cash to pay for them. Presi-
dent Harrison, though occasionally suspicious of the strong-willed,
well-connected former congressman and speaker of the House, and
former presidential candidate (1884), supported the new aggressive
approach to developing Latin American markets. Like Blaine, he felt
that traditional tariff protectionism needed to be modified to protect
domestic markets and secure foreign markets. Harrison, a former sen-
ator, would use his political savvy to move doubters in the Republican
Party to adopt the new weapon of tariff reciprocity.4
The strategy of reciprocity was not unknown in the United States.
Hawai'i had signed an agreement with the United States in 1875 that
permitted Hawaiian sugar to enter the United States duty-free in
return for certain concessions from the kingdom. Canada had signed
a reciprocity agreement in 1854, and there had been several minor
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agreements with Latin American countries in the early 1880s. What
Blaine and Harrison proposed to Congress in 1890 was different and
would set a precedent for commercial policy.
Blaine and Harrison proposed a policy that would give the presi-
dent the power to reduce tariffs on foreign goods (especially raw
materials) when other nations reduced their tariffs for the U.S. prod-
ucts (especially industrial and staple farm products). The policy pro-
vided the president a commercial weapon. Five primary articles of
sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides were to be allowed in duty-free
in exchange for foreign countries' giving American manufactured
goods preferential tariff rates. Such an activist, neomercantilist
approach to world commerce would, Harrison and Blaine felt, appeal
to a broad economic constituency, meet the need for foreign sales,
and prevent domestic depression and economic unrest. Best of all, he
argued, the goals of traditional Republican protectionism would be
combined with a more aggressive search for international markets.
Republican opposition to Blaine and Harrison began almost at
once. Congressman William McKinley from Ohio, a rising star in the
Republican Party, was busy undermining Blaine's Pan-American Con-
ference by proposing a tariff that would raise rates, while permitting
sugar to enter duty-free. Blaine complained loudly that McKinley, in
his ambition to become president, was proposing to give sugar away
without any trade concessions. McKinley's opposition to the bold rec-
iprocity policy ensued from his promise to westerners that free sugar
would be part of the 1890 McKinley Tariff, thereby lowering their
cost of living.5 Moreover, in calling for familiar protective rates, he
hoped to appeal to traditional Republican supporters. For McKinley,
the domestic market, not dubious overseas expansion, was the key to
America's prosperity. Introducing his tariff bill in May, he bitterly
denounced Blaine for mistaking a foreign-policy measure for a tried-
and-true domestic bill. On May 21, 1890, the Republican-dominated
House of Representatives passed the McKinley Tariff with free sugar
and no reciprocity amendment. The Senate prepared to pass the bill
without change. An embarrassing and bitter split over commercial
policy threatened to destroy the Blaine-Harrison initiative.6
Such an inauspicious beginning did not disturb Blaine. Through-
out the late spring and summer of 1890, he directed a public relations
campaign to change Republican opinions. He sent out brochures
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describing the virtues of reciprocity to trade associations, chambers of
commerce, newspapers, farm groups, and boards of trade. In addi-
tion, Harrison and Blaine used every device at their disposal to pres-
sure the House Ways and Means Committee to amend the McKinley
Tariff. Then on July 11, Blaine revealed to the press that the State
Department had deemed that Spain had increased duties on Ameri-
can wheat flour bound for its colonies, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. Blaine
used this as an example of how a reciprocity provision focused on
sugar would provide a lever to force the Spanish to end their discrim-
inatory tariff. While the McKinley Tariff was a just measure, there was,
Blaine argued, "not a section or line in the entire bill that will open a
market for another bushel of wheat of another barrel of pork."7
The longest block of opposition to Blaine came from consumers
who wanted free sugar to be guaranteed under any tariff bill. To meet
congressional demands for free sugar, Blaine expanded his reciproc-
ity proposal to include Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Santo Domingo. These,
added to other Latin American sugar-producing countries, could
provide adequate tax-exempt sugar for the United States. (Hawai'i's
sugar entered the United States duty-free under the provision of the
reciprocity treaty of 1875.) This trader application would also fur-
ther cement America's influences over the economies of Spain's col-
onies in the Caribbean.
By the end of the summer, Blaine and Harrison's intense lobbying,
combined with a troublesome depression in southern and western
agriculture, turned the tide of opinion. The agricultural depression
and the disaffection of western farmers to traditional Republican pro-
tectionism scared even McKinley. The Republicans had to satisfy agrar-
ian interests by seeking new markets or risk losing the farm vote to the
new Populist Party or even to the Democrats. Reciprocity increasingly
seemed the best solution to providing protection to industrial con-
stituencies as well as trade expansion to agrarian and industrial inter-
ests. As Blaine concluded in his speech in Waterville, Maine, at the
end of the summer:
I wish to declare the opinion that the United States has reached a
point where one of its highest duties is to enlarge the area of its foreign
trade. Under the beneficent policy of protection, we have developed a
volume of manufactures, which, in many departments, overruns the
76 THE HAWAIIAN JOURNAL OF HISTORY
demands of the home market. In the field of agriculture, with the
immense propulsion given to its by agricultural implements, we can far
more than produce breadstuffs and provisions for our people; nor
would it be an ambitious destiny for so great a country as ours to man-
ufacture only what we can consume, or to produce only what we can
eat.8
Although many Republicans felt no urgency about the need for
international markets, they did fear the congressional election in
November of 1890 if they did not act and end the schism between the
Harrison administration and McKinley's protectionists. On Septem-
ber 10, the Senate passed the tariff amended for reciprocity, on a
party-line vote of thirty-seven to twenty-eight. The House, after much
rancor, passed the same bill on September 27. McKinley, though pri-
vately bemoaning the surrender of pure protectionist principle,
signed the bill, which would ironically carry his name.9
In Harrison's last two years in office, he and Blaine negotiated rec-
iprocity treaties with eleven nations. In the first, the United States
agreed to keep Brazilian coffee, hides, tea, molasses, and sugar on the
free list. In exchange, Brazil allowed American manufactured goods
and processed agricultural products to enter Brazil duty-free. Free
sugar was also used to obtain concessions from Santo Domingo,
Puerto Rico, Cuba, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, Costa Rico, El
Salvador, and Britain's Caribbean possessions. Except for Cuba and
Brazil, however, the reciprocity treaties failed to provide a major stim-
ulus to the economy. This was due to their average duration of two
years and because both Latin America and the United States experi-
enced major depressions for most of the decade. The reciprocity
treaty with Cuba had the greatest single impact. American exports to
Cuba increased from $12 million in 1891 to $18 million in 1892 and
to $24 million in 1893.10 Cuban exports to the United States increased
from $62 million in 1891 to $79 million in 1893. After the termina-
tion of the treaty due to the Wilson-Gorman Tariff of 1894, the value
of trade with Cuba declined rapidly, thereby unsettling the Cuban
economy and paving the way for Cuba's revolt against Spain
(1895-1898).
Hawai'i was, clearly, not part of the intricate domestic debate over
U.S. COMMERCIAL POLICY AND HAWAl'l 77
the need for expediting foreign markets through reciprocity. Hawai'i
had obtained reciprocity at the behest of President Grant and King
Kalakaua in 1875. The act was renewed in 1887, when King Kalakaua
was pressured by sugar interests to cede unilateral control of Pearl
Harbor to the United States for the duration of the treaty. Thus the
passage of the McKinley Tariff of 1890, which provided duty-free
sugar to major sugar exporters such as Cuba, removed the special
advantage that Hawai'i's sugar had in domestic markets. Moreover,
domestic sugar producers obtained subsidies to make up for lost
market share due to the cheaper imported foreign sugar. Hawai'i fell
into almost immediate depression. By the summer of 1892, Hawaiian
sugar prices fell to a figure below the cost of production. In addition,
land values fell, stores were put out of business, shippers suffered,
labor importers lost money, and bank deposits fell dramatically. Many
businessmen and planters formerly opposed to annexation to the
United States now believed that annexation, which would give plant-
ers access to the domestic subsidy, was the only solution to permanent
instability.
Blaine, who had long felt that Hawai'i was an extension of Califor-
nia and a de facto U.S. protectorate, moved to strengthen American
dominance in the kingdom. In 1891, Blaine began negotiating with
Hawai'i's minister to the United States, H.A.P. Carter. In return for
an equal bounty for Hawai'i's sugar, Blaine asked for a permanent
reciprocity treaty that would include a permanent exclusive conces-
sion of a naval station at Pearl Harbor. Blaine also asked Carter for a
treaty that would deny Hawai'i the right to enter into any treaty with
another power without first informing the United States and would
give the United States the right to land troops in Hawai'i to restore
order when property or citizens were threatened.
The passage of such an agreement received a fatal blow when, in
1891, King Kalakaua died and was succeeded to the throne by Queen
Lili'uokalani, a strong nativist who sought to alter the 1887 Hawaiian
constitution, restore some of the political prerogatives of the monar-
chy, and to restrain the growing power of the economically dominant
Americans. The queen, after reviewing the proposed treaty, objected
to its every tenet and rejected it completely. With increasing eco-
nomic depression, much of the American planter, professional and
78 THE HAWAIIAN JOURNAL OF HISTORY
business class sought complete independence. With the tacit approval
of the Harrison administration, the queen was overthrown in January
of 1893 by a revolution abetted by the landing of Marines to keep
order and protect American lives. The American-led provisional gov-
ernment petitioned for immediate annexation. Though annexation
was delayed until 1898, the McKinley Tariff had had its greatest polit-
ical impact, albeit an unintended one, in Hawai'i.11
To a much lesser extent, the 1894 Wilson-Gorman Tariff, which
ended free sugar and curtailed reciprocity, shaped Hawai'i's political
future. The tariff, passed in the middle of one of America's worst
depressions, restored Hawai'i's privileged status in the market and
thereby helped guarantee the economic and political viability of the
Hawaiian Republic (1894-1898). To what extent was this outcome a
goal of the Wilson-Gorman Tariff? Did Hawai'i's political future fig-
ure in the debate over this tariff?
Like the politics surrounding the more famous McKinley Tariff,
Hawai'i figured little in the 1894 debate over commercial policy. In
1892, Harrison lost his bid for reelection to the Democratic candi-
date, Grover Cleveland. The worsening economic picture, the Home-
stead Steel strike, the growing agrarian attraction to the new Populist
Party and the "free silver" message, Republican factionalism, and
Blaine's illness and the loss of his campaign skills all hurt Harrison's
chances.12 Moreover, the reciprocity feature of the McKinley Tariff
had not worked miracles in creating access to the promised Latin
American markets.
With Cleveland and the Democratic Party facing a worsening
depression, a tariff debate took place under fears generated by a vio-
lent Pullman strike and the march of Jacob Coxey's "army" on the
nation's capital. William Wilson, chairman of the House Ways and
Means Committee, drafted a tariff bill that substantially lowered
duties. Although both Republicans and Democrats agreed that expan-
sion of foreign trade was necessary, Democrats complained that high
tariff rates aided domestic monopolies while increasing the cost of liv-
ing for average consumers. Wilson's bill proposed to end duties on
key raw materials such as hides, wool, lumber, coal, copper, iron ore,
and raw sugar. Cheaper raw products, not subject to the caprice of
negotiated reciprocal arrangements, would stabilize the economy,
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reduce government intrusions in the marketplace, and provide for
foreign economic expansion. In addition, reduced tariffs on raw
materials would lower production costs, thus making domestic goods
more attractive to foreign buyers. Moreover, such a stance was con-
sonant with traditional Democratic opposition to interference in free
markets, which threatened individualism and self-reliance. Cleveland
and the Democrats agreed with Republicans that foreign market
expansion designed to alleviate the unsold surplus in the depression
of 1893-1897 was essential. But for Cleveland, a broad and guaran-
teed free raw material strategy was the heart of effective expansion,
not reciprocity. Moreover, Cleveland felt the strategy might attract
farm support in the South and West at a time when many farmers were
deserting the party for the Populist Party and free silver. The duty-
free coal and iron ore might also attract support from New England
and Midwest manufacturers. Thus, Cleveland's duty-free raw materi-
als strategy was designed to meet both urgent domestic political and
foreign-policy needs.13
The Wilson-sponsored bill passed the House on February 1, 1894,
on a party-line vote and was sent to the Senate. There, with only a slim
Democratic majority, Maryland Senator Arthur Gorman took com-
mand. Quickly, Cleveland's relative lack of influence over his party, in
the middle of a dreadful depression, became apparent. Driven by
numerous pressure groups demanding protection from cheap for-
eign imports, sugar, coal, and iron ore were removed from the duty-
free list. Gorman himself had large investments in domestic sugar
refining that would be hurt by duty-free sugar from countries like
Cuba. Many senators, moreover, were infuriated by Cleveland's mak-
ing important nominations for federal positions without traditional
and informal advice and consent.14 Many found Cleveland sanctimo-
nious and insincere on issues ranging from free silver to tariff reform.
Under pressure from the Senate and powerful Louisiana sugar
planters, and in need of revenues, Cleveland approved the duty on
foreign sugar. Dismayed by the angry reaction to his interference by
many Democratic senators, he allowed the Wilson-Gorman Tariff,
which emerged from conference committee to become law. Lumber
and wool remained on the free list. Overall tariff rates on manufac-
tured goods were reduced, and sugar was restored to the dutiable list.
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Crushing Democratic defeats in the 1894 congressional election and
1896 presidential elections would ensure that limited reciprocity
would be restored in 1897 under the Republican President McKinley.
With the return of tariff protection for domestic sugar, Cuba's
economy was devastated, and the agricultural depression set the stage
for the Cuban Revolution and ultimately the Spanish-American War.15
For Hawai'i's fledgling republic, however, the tariff was joyfully
received. Hawai'i sugar exports to the United States were not subject
to the Wilson-Gorman Tariff as Hawai'i was still subject to the reci-
procity treaties of 1875 and 1887. The resumption of Hawai'i special
status as the only foreign producer without a tariff to pay underwrote
the Hawaiian republic's prosperity. It also guaranteed that Hawai'i's
economy would continue to be closely integrated with the U.S. econ-
omy, which would, for many planters, make annexation in 1898 a
natural political extension of that economic relationship.
Interestingly, though Cleveland and Harrison had different
approaches to commercial policy and different attitudes about the
rectitude of annexing Hawai'i in 1893, both were in agreement with
the dominant late nineteenth-century consensus regarding expan-
sion. Both presidents believed that economic growth and success in
Latin American and Asian markets were both natural and necessary
to secure domestic prosperity and tranquility. Both presidents, and a
majority of both parties, assumed that the United States should be
predominant in the Western Hemisphere and enjoy a strategic capac-
ity in the Pacific. Neither wanted the exposure, risk, and controversy
of acquiring a formal empire, but both sought an aggressive eco-
nomic and political thrust into key markets. Indeed, in the midst of
a serious depression that would ruin many of his political initiatives,
Cleveland supported increased appropriations to continue the con-
struction of a modern navy. Cleveland aggressively defended the
Monroe Doctrine, approved of Cuba's nascent revolt against Spain,
pursued America's interests in Cuba, called for a consular service
friendlier to U.S. business interests, and refused to restore Queen
Lili'uokalani to her throne.16 Consonant with this assertive foreign-
policy posture, he could only appreciate that the short-lived Wilson-
Gorman Tariff (revised by the Dingley Tariff of 1897) secured eco-
nomic dominance in the strategically vital Hawaiian Islands.
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Thus, the causes of the controversial McKinley Tariff and the Wil-
son-Gorman Tariff lay almost exclusively in the dynamic of domestic
politics, interest-group rivalry, and the emerging consensus that a
growing industrial economy required access to foreign markets, par-
ticularly in Latin America. A largely unanticipated consequence was
the unsettling of Hawai'i's precarious monocultural economy and the
undermining of the kingdom's independence. Hawai'i's economy
was, as is still the case as the twenty-first century begins, dangerously
dependent on economic and political decisions made in remote loca-
tions. That Hawai'i had no voice in the vigorous domestic debate over
commercial policy in the 1890s and yet experienced such dramatic
consequences from that debate sums up the problematic nature of
the kingdom's and the subsequent republic's viability.
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